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Theodor Ziehen was a prominent German psychiatrist and psychologist and a marginal phi-
losopher of the first half of the 20th century who developed an exotic subjective-idealistic the-
ory based on quasi-empirical psychological arguments. Although Ziehen was seen by contem-
poraries (most prominently by Vladimir Lenin) as a representative of the same philosophical 
current (empirio-criticism) as Mach and Avenarius, he never achieved their prominence in 
the history of philosophy. At the same time, Ziehen’s philosophy became influential in Ger-
man biology, first of all, due to his direct and very strong impact on Bernhard Rensch. Rensch, 
in his turn, was the most significant figure on the international scene of what is known as the 
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis in biology. Rensch was not the only biologist influenced by 
Ziehen’s ideas. Ziehen had some communication with the “German Darwin” Ernst Haeckel 
and played a prominent role in the concept of the founder of biological systematics Willi Hen-
nig. How to explain Ziehen’s prominent place in the history of evolutionary biology, despite 
his obscurity in the history of philosophy? Our hypothesis is that Ziehen became a visible 
figure in evolutionary theory because of the monistic bias in German biology. Ziehen’s episte-
mology appeared to be compatible with evolutionary monism and was developed by a practic-
ing psychiatrist therefore obtaining a character of a quasi-experimental doctrine.
Keywords: Theodor Ziehen, Identism, empirio-criticism, Ernst Haeckel, Bernhard Rensch, 
Willi Hennig, psychomonism, monism, Modern Synthesis.
Introduction
The majority of biologists and historians of biology agree that there were three major 
historical forms of Darwinism [1–3]. Classical Darwinism is Darwin’s own theory, which 
pushed forward the very idea of organic evolution and common descent while also in-
troducing the principle of natural selection within the broad theoretical context. Clas-
sical Darwinism was followed by a split between neo-Darwinism and old-Darwinism: At 
the end of the 19th century, Canadian-born English psychologist George John Romanes 
(1848–1894) recognized the crucial importance of the question “whether natural selection 
has been the sole, or but the main cause of organic evolution” [4, p. 1]. Answering this ques-
tion, Romanes opposed Darwin, who admitted that natural selection has been assisted by 
the “subordinate principles”, and Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) along with August 
Weismann (1834–1914), maintaining that natural selection should be regarded as the only 
cause of evolution. To denote “the pure theory of natural selection to the exclusion of any 
supplementary theory” Romanes coined the term neo-Darwinism [4, p. 12]. Under ‘sup-
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plementary theories’ Romanes understood ‘Lamarckian factors’ (use-inheritance) and the 
theory of sexual selection. The original Darwinian line of thinking preserving the priority 
of natural selection, but combining both Lamarckian and selectionist factors along with 
moderate orthogenesis and some mutationism, was continued by the “old-Darwinian” 
school represented, first of all, by the “German Darwin” Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) and 
his successor at Jena University Ludwig Plate (1862–1937).
Finally, the Synthetic Theory of Evolution (STE) or the Modern Synthesis originated in 
the early 1930s, after a period of an “eclipse” of Darwinism [5] and the associated dom-
inance of alternative (non-Darwinian) theories of evolution. According to Ernst Mayr 
(1904–2005), the Synthesis was completed in 1947  and the so-called period of ‘post-
synthesis’ began [6, p. 20]. The STE proposed a logically coherent and empirically well-
substantiated theoretical system, which incorporated several branches of biology such as 
classical genetics, population genetics, systematics, evolutionary morphology, develop-
mental biology, palaeontology, etc. Within the STE, “non-selectionist factors of evolu-
tion, especially isolation, chance events, and population size are emphasized. Selection is 
regarded as important, but only as one of several evolutionary factors” [1, p. 44]. With all 
these factors taken into account, the STE succeeded in proposing a convincing theory of 
macroevolution.
In Germany, two major figures in the growth of evolutionary theory were Ernst Hae-
ckel and Berhard Rensch (1900–1990). Ernst Haeckel was a younger contemporary of 
Darwin and one of his most influential proponents on the continent. Haeckel belongs to 
an old-Darwinian current, i.e. his goal was to exactly follow Darwin in his description of 
evolutionary mechanisms. Rensch was, arguably, the most influential figure on the inter-
national scene of what is known as the Modern Synthesis in Germany [7]. Simply put, 
Haeckel and Rensch were the two most important advocates of Darwinism in German 
lands in both “classical” and “synthetical” periods of the growth of evolutionary biology. 
Yet, it is astonishing that both of them were under the influence of a relatively little-known 
German philosopher and psychologist Theodor Ziehen (1862–1950). Especially Rensch 
owed his whole philosophical worldview to Ziehen. Ziehen also significantly influenced 
the “father” of phylogenetic systematics Willi Hennig (1913–1976), being one of his ma-
jor philosophical inspirations along with Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972) [8]. At the 
same time, Ziehen remains marginal in the history of philosophy. For example, the in-
clusive Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides only three references to Ziehen in 
the context of discussing logics and psychology, but without mentioning his major philo-
sophical publications1.
Our objective here is to describe Ziehen’s philosophical views and to explain why 
he became so influential in the history of German evolutionary biology, while remaining 
almost fully ignored by the standard histories of philosophy.
Theodor Ziehen’s life path
It is difficult to attribute Ziehen to a certain scientific discipline. He was a psycholo-
gist, neurologist, psychiatrist, and philosopher who enjoyed great fame during his life 
time, but subsequently was almost completely neglected by the history of science and 
1 https://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=Ziehen (accessed: January 21, 2019).
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philosophy: “Theodor Ziehen belongs among the 
great universal thinkers of the end of the nine-
teenth century and the twentieth century. Unfor-
tunately, his accomplishments have largely been 
forgotten, although contemporaries compared 
him to Einstein and Leibniz” [9, p. 1369].
Ziehen was born on 12 November 1862  in 
Frankfurt am Main as the son of a Protestant 
theologian, philologist, and writer Eduard Zie-
hen (1819–1884)  [10, p. 211]. His brother Lud-
wig Ziehen (1871–1944) is known as a peda-
gogue and historian. Ziehen attended a so called 
“humanist high school” (humanistisches Gym-
nasium), where he became proficient in classical 
languages (Greek and Latin) and showed a philo-
sophical interest especially to the philosophy of 
Plato, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, 
and Indian philosophy. Ziehen himself wrote 
about this period of his life: “Already at that time 
I decided that philosophy is the ultimate objective of my life” [10, p. 220].
Despite his love for philosophy, he decided to study medicine because it was the only 
way to receive a stipend, which he urgently needed. In 1881, he enrolled in the Würzburg 
university where attended classes in the history of philosophy by Georg Neudecker (born 
in 1850) who, in his turn, was significantly influenced by Fichte. Following Neudecker’s 
advice, Ziehen studied modern philosophers, paying special attention to Spinoza, David 
Hume, Hegel, and George Berkeley. From the side of the natural sciences, he was deeply 
impressed by the famous botanist Julius Sachs (1832–1897) [10, p. 221]. Two years later 
(1883) he moved to Berlin to continue his medical education and received his doctorate 
in 1885 with the PhD thesis Über die Krämpfe infolge elektrischer Reizung der Großhirn-
rinde (On the Spasms of Cerebral Cortex as a Consequence of Electrical Stimulation). His 
decision to specialize in psychiatry was connected with its close connections to psychol-
ogy and philosophy. Besides medicine and philosophy, Ziehen studied mathematics and 
theoretical physics.
In 1885 he began to work as an assistant volunteer at the famous mental hospital in 
Görlitz under the guidance of Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828–1899) and in 1886 he moved 
to Jena to become a “senior doctor” (Oberarzt) in Otto Binswanger’s (1852–1929) psychi-
atric clinic [11, p. 422]. Ziehen remained in Jena for 14 years. At that time, Jena was one of 
the major places in the history of Darwinism due to the activities of Ernst Haeckel. In Jena, 
Ziehen also came into contact with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), who was one of his 
patients. In 1887 Ziehen completed his Habilitation (Dr. Sc. thesis) with the topic Sphyg-
mographische Untersuchungen an Geisteskranken (Sphygmographic Studies on Mentally 
Ill Patients) and became a “Privatdozent” for psychiatry [11, p. 423].
In 1892, Ziehen became an extraordinary professor in Jena, but in 1896 he left the 
clinic and opened a private neurological practice [11, p. 424].
In 1900 he got a call for a professorship of psychiatry in Utrecht, and three years later 
(1903) he took up the Chair in Psychiatry at Halle. After only a half a year in Halle, Zie-
Fig. 1. Portrait of Theodor Ziehen (from: 
[10])
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hen moved to Berlin to become the Director of the Clinic for Psychiatry and Neurology 
at the famous Charité Hospital, a post he maintained until his retirement in 1912, during 
which he received in 1910 a doctorate (honoris causa) from the Philosophical Faculty at 
Berlin University for his important contributions to philosophy [11, p. 425]. In 1912 he 
moved with his family to a small villa in Wiesbaden, where he spent a few years devoted 
to psychology and philosophy. During the First World War Ziehen helped establish the 
Flemish University in Ghent, but in 1917 came back to Halle as a professor of philoso-
phy, co-director of philosophical seminars, and a keeper of a psychophysical collection. 
In that period, he divided his time between philosophy, child psychology, and pedagogy. 
In 1923 he became a Dean of the Philosophical Faculty and in 1927, Rector in Halle [11, 
p. 425]. In 1930 he retired and moved to Wiesbaden, where he died on 29  December 
1950. He avoided membership in the Nazi Party and never supported national socialism 
[11, p. 426], which was unusual among German physicians. 45 % of German physicians 
belonged to the Nazi party, about 7 times the mean rate for the employed male popula-
tion of Germany [12].
Ziehen’s entire oeuvre amounts to more than 400 works on various subjects includ-
ing two dozen monographs. A significant part of his later works is devoted to philosophy.
Fig. 2. Title page of Ziehen’s book “Die Grundlagen 
der Psychologie” (1915)
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Ziehen’s philosophy
Ziehen developed a philosophical theory proceeding from psychological “observa-
tions” and closely related to psychology, medicine, and natural sciences in general. His 
philosophy was thought to be a foundation of psychology. For example, the first volume of 
his Die Grundlagen der Psychologie (Foundations of Psychology) had the subtitle Erkennt-
nistheoretische Grundlagen der Psychologie (The Epistemological Foundations of Psychol-
ogy) and was completely devoted to his theory of knowledge and cognition [13].
His objective was to establish an epistemology “free of speculations” but based on the 
analysis of facts. Along the lines of the philosophies of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, 
Ziehen developed his own philosophical approach that was marked by realism and objec-
tivism. His idealistic cognitive theory, which directly opposed the growing influence of 
materialism in the natural sciences, led to massive attacks by Marxists, including Vladimir 
Lenin (1970–1924) [9]. Indeed, both Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Vladimir Lenin cited 
Ziehen. Mach seemed to hold mixed opinions about Ziehen. For example, in the intro-
duction to the Russian edition of his “Analysis of sensations” first published in 1908, and 
later mentioned by Lenin, Mach wrote that at the end of the 1880s that after he had come 
into contact with the works of Avenarius (1843–1996), Wilhelm Schuppe (1836–1913) 
and Ziehen, he came to the conclusion that they were following very close — if not the 
same — paths [14, p. 43]. Yet, in a private letter to the Austrian philosopher Wilhelm Jeru-
salem (1854–1923) on July 1, 1915, Mach was rather skeptical about Ziehen’s philosophi-
cal achievements: “I have partly read Ziehen2 and am of your opinion about him. For the 
branding together of Plato and Goethe, if I may be allowed to give an opinion, strikes me 
as rather comical” [15, p. 225]. As we will later see, it is exactly this synthesis of Plato and 
Goethe that made Ziehen popular among German evolutionists. In fact, Lenin criticized 
Ziehen as a “psychomonist” and one of the followers of Mach and Avenarius in his famous 
Materialism and Empirio-criticism [16].
Indeed, psychomonism seems to be a suitable characteristic of Ziehen’s philosophy, 
although Ziehen himself strictly declined this term [17, p. 15] rendering his relationship to 
positivism more complex: although he was seen as a follower of Mach and Avenarius, the 
fact is that Ziehen developed his epistemology independently, having completed the first 
version of the Psychophysiologische Erkenntnistheorie (Psychophysiological Epistemology) 
in 1898 prior to reading Mach, Avenarius, and Schuppe [10].
In the 2nd edition of Psychophysiologische Erkenntnistheorie Ziehen summarized his 
theory of knowledge [18]. He begins with the “given” (later he invents the notion “Gig-
nomene”, see [17, p. 2]), with sensations and perceptions: “Everything that is given is either 
sensation or perception. Initially, we get sensations; then they are followed by recollec-
tions and perceptions” [18, p. 4]. This, according to Ziehen, is consistent with empiri-
cal psychology. All things are only perceptions. Simple perceptions lay a foundation for 
complex perceptions having no direct analogies in sensations. For example, a complex 
perception “the plant” does not refer to any particular plant. The actual objective of em-
pirical psychology is the study of complex perceptions [18, p. 6]. The complex perceptions 
“Myself ” and “Thing” make sense only as perceptions having no independent “reality”. To 
support his view, Ziehen appeals to Berkeley’s claim: “The external objects subsist not by 
themselves, but exist in our minds” [18, p. 7]. The perception of causality is a perception 
2 With all probability he read Ziehen‘s Die Grundlagen der Psychologie (1915).
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of relationships. A certain repeatedly occurring order of sensations amounts to the idea 
of causality. The perception of relationships plays a crucial role in natural sciences, which 
operate with such perceptions as identity (sameness), affinity, distinctness, change, causal-
ity, and others. For example, the first three relationships (sameness, affinity, distinctness) 
lay the foundation for systematic categories in biology (individual, species, genus, etc.) 
[18, p. 17]. Along these lines arrives Ziehen at what he calls “the law of causality” (Kau-
salgesetz): 1. Similar succession of sensations will be often repeated; 2. The succession of 
sensations remains the same when substituted by perceptions. The “causal lawfulness” 
will be distinguished from a “parallel lawfulness”, something we would call a subjective 
perception of things. Ziehen illustrates this idea of causal and parallel lawfulness with 
two examples [10, p. 227]. The fall of a stone causes a cascade of physiological reactions 
including the activation of the cerebral cortex. It is repeatable and independent of indi-
vidual sensations. This is an example of a causally lawful process. A perception of a “blue 
sky” illustrates a parallel lawfulness, because there is no “blue” out there and the sky may 
appear as blue or red, depending on many factors.
All perceptions may undergo a process of “reduction”. As we have already mentioned, 
Ziehen distinguished between sensations and perceptions. Simple perceptions are simple 
recollections of sensations. These recollections, however, will be combined and re-com-
bined once again until they build up a coherent picture of sensations. Such perceptions, 
providing a coherent picture of the world out there, are the result of the process of “reduc-
tion” [18, p. 40]. The “reduction” is possible due to the “law of causality” mentioned above. 
Sometimes Ziehen used the term “reductions” and “causal components” interchangeably 
[18, p. 44]. There are three types of reduction, according to Ziehen. The reduction of the 
external objects, the reduction of the self, and the reductions of other “selfs” (other sub-
jects). Ziehen is against solipsism, because “self ” is not something primarily given. “Self ” 
is the result of both reduction as well as of external objects. Kant, according to Ziehen, ap-
proached the same issue when introducing his famous notion of the “thing-in-itself ”. Yet, 
Ziehen emphasizes that current researchers have a privilege to be able to investigate this 
problem by means of experimental psychology and physiology. These new branches of sci-
ence support the view that neither primary sensations nor the outcomes of reduction are 
autonomous. But they are also not rigidly connected to each other. There are laws regu-
lating relationships between various reduction processes. All sensations and perceptions 
undergo reduction. Ultimately, “any religion is more or less a complex system of reduced 
perceptions” [18, p. 94]. The same is true for any scientific hypothesis or any philosophical 
system including Ziehen’s very own epistemology. To the objection that objective laws of 
nature would disappear in this purely psychic universe, Ziehen answered that the laws of 
physics will persist, but they will be seen as describing relations between reduced sensa-
tions (perceptions) and not between material bodies out there [18, p. 108].
Ziehen’s epistemology is tightly connected to what can be called his ontology. In the 
Grundlagen der Psychologie, Ziehen introduced “the principle of immanence” [13, p. 11]. It 
embraced three logically interconnected claims: 1. It is impossible to establish a meaning-
ful concept of type [Gattung] covering all the given [Gignomene]; 2. It is impossible to dis-
tinguish Gignomene from non-Gignomene; 3. It is impossible to imagine something that 
would be totally different from Gignomene. In other words, the “immanent philosophy” 
is beyond the opposition between “physical” and “psychical”. The “immanent philosophy” 
rejects both “metaphysical” and “metapsychical” [13, p. 12].
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Of primary importance to our discussion here is that the “principle of immanence” 
builds a direct bridge between Ziehen’s epistemology and his monism: “It is evident that 
the immanence principle, in a certain sense, establishes monism” [13, p. 14]. For Ziehen, 
this was especially true of the third claim of the principle, because it excludes the existence 
of something essentially different from the “given”. A real transcendence is impossible. All 
“transcendences” found in the history of philosophy are just “words”.
The mature version of both Ziehen’s epistemology and ontology can be found in two 
volumes of the second edition of his Erkenntnistheorie (Theory of Knowledge) [17; 19]. 
The first volume has the subtitle Allgemeine Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. Spezielle 
Erkenntnistheorie der Empfindungstatsachen einschließlich Raumtheorie [General Founda-
tion of Epistemology. Special Epistemology of Sensations Including the Theory of Space]. 
The second part published in 1939 is devoted to Zeittheorie. Wirklichkeitsproblem. Erk-
enntnistheorie der anorganischen Natur (erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen der Physik). 
Kausalität [Theory of Time. The Problem of Reality. Epistemology of the Inorganic Nature 
(Epistemological Foundations of Physics). Causality].
Here Ziehen even more explicitly expressed his monist ontology. Both his epistemol-
ogy and his monism became crucial for the growth of German evolutionary biology.
Bernhard Rensch Ziehen’s influence
Bernhard Rensch was of the best known “architects” of the Evolutionary Synthesis, 
who crucially contributed to the growth of Darwinism in Germany and worldwide. At the 
same time, Rensch created an exotic and sophisticated evolutionary metaphysics, which 
became an integrated part of his universal evolutionism.
In 1947 Rensch published his most important “synthetic” book Neuere Probleme der 
Abstammungslehre: Die Transspezifische Evolution [20]. The book, which became known 
in English-speaking countries under the title Evolution above the Species Level, was written 
in Prague during the Second World War. The draft of the contents of the book found in the 
Archives of the Academy of Sciences in Prague shows that Rensch conceived his work from 
the very beginning as a deep theoretical investigation with explicit methodological reflec-
tions [21]. It is not a coincidence that already in the first edition of the book, Rensch cited 
Theodor Ziehen, his main philosophical inspiration. In this book Ziehen is mentioned 
more often than Darwin. From the viewpoint of evolutionary theory, the objective of the 
book was to substantiate the Darwinian theory of macroevolution. Rensch’s novel was 
also the line of argumentation developed as a contribution to epistemology, philosophy of 
science, and metaphysics, and written under the influence Ziehen. In subsequent books, 
Rensch developed this initial concept into a full-blown philosophical system, which laid 
the foundation for his evolutionary views.
In one of his last works, Probleme genereller Determiniertheit allen Geschehens (The 
Problems of the General Determinacy of all Occurrences), Rensch presented his panthe-
istic metaphysics as a holistic and scientifically based worldview [22, p. 11]. Rensch con-
structs his philosophy proceeding from the general epistemological assumption that “the 
only entirely reliable foundation for a philosophical worldview is the indisputable reality 
[Wirklichkeit] of the phenomena [Tatsachen] of consciousness” [22, p. 11]. This sounds 
like a repetition of Ziehen’s “immanence principle”, but Rensch goes further and provides 
his epistemology with an evolutionary explanation. The very human ability to analyze is 
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an inherited feature acquired in the course of evolution. The most essential trait of human 
ability to “draw conclusions” can be explained by the adaptedness of the human mental 
apparatus to the regularities of the external world. This adaptedness to the lawfulness of 
the “extra-mental” reality is the premise of the correlation between the mental and extra-
mental worlds. Rensch makes Ziehen’s philosophy less exotic by claiming that there is, 
indeed, only one single reality, but it has two fundamentally different aspects: the mental 
and the material.
The basis of Rensch’s philosophy includes the negation of acausal processes. In his 
view, both the inorganic and the organic worlds are causally determined [22, p. 15–16]. 
Thus natural selection is the major factor determining organismic evolution. Biological 
progress can be fully explained in terms of Darwinian selectionism. For Rensch, biologi-
cal evolution is a determined and gradual process, although it involves stochastic events, 
such as random mutations.
The evolution of human cultures proceeds mostly on the level of non-heritable char-
acters, Rensch continues, and it is important to distinguish between psychic and neu-
rophysiological phenomena. Rensch refers to Karl Popper’s concept of the relationships 
between psychic and neurophysiologic levels as an example of dualism. Popper assumed 
that there are two principally different essences [Seinswesen]: the psychic phenomena, on 
the one hand, and the neurophysiological on the other. Rensch formulates his own posi-
tion by contrasting it to Popper’s dualism. If purely psychic phenomena, as for example 
volition, could influence muscle contractions, Rensch argues, it would violate the law of 
energy conservation making the purely biochemical explanation of muscle contractions 
impossible [22, p. 34].
Another possibility would be to assume that mental [geistige] processes run in paral-
lel to events in a material world. Rensch labels this position psychological parallelism. Yet, 
psychological parallelism cannot explain why the physiologically identical brain processes 
can cause various mental effects.
Following Ziehen, Rensch argued, that for a human being the only indisputable ob-
jects are his own psychic phenomena resulting from immediate experiences: perceptions, 
imaginations, feelings, and thoughts. Only an analysis of these experiences makes it pos-
sible to develop concepts of an extra-mental world, which appears as a visible and testable 
reality. Matter appears as “the ultimate something”, which will perhaps in the future be 
described only in terms of interactions of various forces, causal chains, and fundamental 
constants. Rensch appealed to Ziehen’s psycho-physiological epistemology to introduce a 
“monistic principle” [22, p. 29]. As any kind of philosophical monism, the “monistic prin-
ciple” constitutes an ultimate, ontologically definable, reality, which cannot be multiplied 
or decomposed into further elements. Rensch argued that the reduction of the elementary 
mental features (sensations and perceptions) to their foundations will inevitably lead to 
the concept of “the ultimate something” that underlies the world and cannot be decom-
posed to further elements [22, p. 35]. One could appeal to Spinoza’s concept of substance 
in order to avoid dualism and to give the name to this “ultimate something”, Rensch ar-
gued.
Along these lines, Rensch arrived at his concept of psychophysical identism [22, p. 36]. 
Rensch presented this concept for the first time in the Abstammungslehre [20], although 
at that time he employed another term (with the same meaning) hylopsychism, also bor-
rowed from Ziehen [19, p. 113]. Quite in accord with Ziehen, Rensch claimed: “We would 
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like to point out here once more that this worldview is an idealistic one, since what is 
primarily given to us is the ‘psychic’; there is definitely no opposition between subject 
and object, matter and soul; even the abstract reductionist world [Reduktwelt] of natural 
scientists should not be searched for outside of the ‘conscious’ [Bewußten]” [20, p. 372].
In the Biophilosophie [23; 24], Rensch converted Ziehen’s idealism into the so called 
“identistic” foundation of his philosophy of biology and coined the term “panpsychistic-
identical or polynomistic world view”. Rensch formulated two basic “facts” constituting 
the basis of panpsychistic identism: “1. The only reality of which we can be absolutely 
certain relates to experienced phenomena, which include sensations, mental images, feel-
ings, and volitional processes as a whole. 2. Man does not consist of two separate compo-
nents — matter and mind, or body and soul, but represents an indivisible psychophysical 
unity” [24, p. 299].
Rensch’s panpsychism lead to conclusions crucial for evolutionary biology. First of 
all, it was the hypothesis of psycho-phylogeny proving that all psychic abilities develop 
gradually in the course of phylogeny. Even protists react to impulses in a way similar to 
that of organisms with a nervous system. But if we admit that the psychic abilities de-
veloped during the entire course of phylogeny as a continuous process, why should we 
ascribe “the Psychic” only to the first stages of biological evolution without looking for its 
roots in the geological and astronomic pre-history of evolution? Rensch claims that we 
can trace this down to the level of proto-phenomena preceding any kind of material evo-
lution (both abiotic and biological) and underlying the phenomenological nature of the 
material world: “the proto-phenomena precede even the inanimate pre-stages of phenom-
ena, and respectively matter is of a proto-phenomenal nature” [24, p. 406]. In other words, 
the protopsychic properties are immanent to matter. Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit 
in sensu can therefore be substantiated also phylogenetically, Rensch concludes. In other 
words, Rensch’s identism is a kind of monism, which was inspired by Ziehen.
Rensch was the most important, but not the only German evolutionary scientist who 
was under Ziehen’s influence. We must also consider Ernst Haeckel, certainly the most 
prominent champion of early Darwinism in Germany [25].
Quite soon after the publication of Darwin’s seminal On the Origin of Species [26], 
Haeckel began serious research along these Darwinian lines. It is now 150 year ago that 
Haeckel published his first major scientific work, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, 
in 1866 [27]. Here for the first time he started to formulate his famous biogenetic law, 
claiming that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The popularisation of Haeckel’s ideas fol-
lowed in 1868 when a collection of lectures that he had held at Jena University (where 
he was the first professor of zoology) were published as Natural History of Creation [28]. 
This popular science book became a bestseller and was also translated into many dif-
ferent languages. Thereafter, Haeckel published several books popularising Darwinian 
theory and the philosophy of monism, which he passionately supported. Ziehen belongs 
to the younger generation of monism champions; he was four years old when Haeckel had 
already published his monumental pro-Darwinian theory, so one cannot claim that he 
shaped Haeckel’s views. However, Ziehen exchanged correspondence with Haeckel, and 
devoted a voluminous paper to the analysis of Haeckel’s monism [29]. Ziehen was critical 
towards Haeckel’s monism, because Haeckel, in his view, failed to elaborate a sound epis-
temology. Ziehen praised Haeckel for the “monistic principle”, but claimed that Haeckel 
never created a philosophical system substantiating this principle, restricting himself to 
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Fig. 3. Theodor Ziehen was in personal communication both with Haeck-
el and Rensch. Here Ziehen’s letter (02.12.1891)  to Haeckel (from the Ernst-
Haeckel-Hause Archive in Jena). In this letter Ziehen thanks Haeckel for send-
ing him a copy of Anthropogenie
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a declarative mode. Haeckel, in his turn, listed Ziehen’s Leitfaden der physiologischen Psy-
chologie (Guidelines of physiological psychology, [30]) as recommended reading in his 
Anthropogenie [31].
In addition, it should be mentioned that Ziehen was one of the major philosophi-
cal inspirations for the founder of phylogenetic systematics, Willi Hennig. Phylogenetic 
systematics is a field of biology reconstructing the ways that have led to the current biodi-
versity. As the name suggests, phylogenetic systematics is based on the concept of phylog-
eny as coined by Ernst Haeckel. Hennig elaborated a philosophy underlying his systemat-
ics that was based on Ziehen, Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and Ludwig Bertalanffy [32]. 
Hennig, among others, was fascinated by Ziehen’s idea species, and higher taxa; indeed, 
for him all life on Earth are to be considered individuals of increasing complexity. But 
most crucial for Hennig was Ziehen’s monistic ontology: “For Ziehen, prodigiously cited 
by Hennig, the material causes of our sensory perceptions accordingly are not objects, 
but centers of increased density in a global field of energy. On that account, a qualitative 
difference between matter and energy disappears <…>” [33].
Conclusions
Theodor Ziehen was a marginal German philosopher of the first half of the 20th cen-
tury who developed an exotic subjective-idealistic theory based on quasi-experimental 
psychological methods. Although Ziehen was seen by contemporaries (most prominently 
by Vladimir Lenin) as a representative of the same current as Mach and Avenarius, he 
never achieved their prominence in the histories of philosophy. For example, The Ox-
ford Companion to Philosophy mentions both Mach and Avenarius, but completely ne-
glects Ziehen [34]. The same is true for German-language textbooks and encyclopedias. 
The Dictionary Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften (Philosophy and Natural Sciences), 
specifically aimed to elucidate the connection between science and philosophy, does not 
mention Ziehen at all [35]. How to explain Ziehen’s prominent place in the history of evo-
lutionary biology, despite his obscurity in the history of philosophy?
Our hypothesis is that Ziehen became a visible figure in evolutionary theory because 
German biology was strongly influenced by the philosophy of monism. Monism was a 
characteristic feature of German tradition in evolutionary biology and was not as promi-
nently presented in English-speaking or Russian speaking countries [36]. Both of the most 
important figures of the first and the second Darwinian revolutions in Germany were 
explicit monists. Haeckel’s successor in Jena Ludwig Plate was an explicit monist as well, 
although he developed his own “philosophy”.
In Haeckel’s view, evolution is a universal phenomenon affecting everything from 
inorganic matter to man. He believed in the unity of body and soul, and the unity of spirit 
and matter. This monism guided all of Haeckel’s major works, beginning with the Gener-
elle Morphologie [37]. Monism and evolutionary theory were for Haeckel parts of the same 
research program labelled the “monistic doctrine of evolution” (monistische Entwicklung-
slehre), and ultimately were aimed at unifying science and religion on a biological founda-
tion [38, p. 66]. Rensch, being a major German “co-architect” of the Modern Synthesis, 
developed his version of synthetic Darwinism into an all-embracing metaphysical con-
ception based on a kind of Spinozism situated within the same tradition as Haeckel’s mon-
ism. Henning did not escape the monist temptation either. Looking for the separation of 
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subjective from objective components of perception in the pursuit of systematics, Hennig 
recognised Ziehen’s monism as a philosophy that would allow that distinction [32]. Be-
sides, Ziehen’s monist epistemology was attractive to biologists because it looked like a 
fundamental philosophy originating from an experimental science. Ziehen was at home 
among evolutionists who were looking for a philosophically deep methodology devel-
oped by “somebody like us”. In this way, the exotic psychologist Theodor Ziehen became 
a philosophical inspiration for Bernhard Rensch and other German evolutionists, while 
disappearing from the history of philosophy [38].
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Биология и панпсихизм: немецкие эволюционисты 
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Теодор Циен (в  отечественной литературе иногда: Циген) был известным немецким 
психиатром и  психологом и  малоизвестным философом первой половины ХХ  в., 
создавшим экзотическое субъективно-идеалистическое учение на квазиэксперимен-
тальных основаниях. Несмотря на то что современники (например, В. Ленин) счита-
ли Циена представителем того же философского направления (эмпириокритицизм), 
что и Мах и Авенариус, он никогда не достигал их уровня известности в философии. 
В то же время философия Циена оказала значительное влияние на немецкую биоло-
гию, прежде всего благодаря Бернхарду Реншу, который, в свою очередь, был наибо-
лее значительной фигурой в немецкой эволюционной биологии как один из создателей 
«современного синтеза» (т. е. современного дарвинизма). Ренш не был единственным 
биологом, испытавшим влияние Циена. Циен находился в контакте с «немецким Дар-
вином» Эрнстом Геккелем и сыграл заметную роль в теоретическом корпусе основа-
теля биологической систематики Вилли Хеннига. Каким образом можно объяснить 
малозаметную роль Циена в истории философии, притом что его философия оказалась 
востребована в биологии? Наша гипотеза заключается в том, что Циен стал заметной 
фигурой в истории биологии, поскольку его эпистемология оказалась хорошо совме-
стимой с монизмом, широко распространенным в немецких естественных науках. Кро-
ме того, репутация Циена как практикующего психиатра способствовала восприятию 
его философского учения как квазиэкспериментального.
Ключевые слова: Теодор Циен (Циген), идентизм, эмпириокритицизм, Эрнст Геккель, 
Бернхард Ренш, Вилли Хенниг, психомонизм, монизм, синтетическая теория эволю-
ции.
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